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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
ADMIRAI/rY-MEANING oF "SHoRE."-Certain sections of a dry dock con-
taining a tug were driven by a violent storm acros.s the Mobile River and 
left on the land above the ordinary high water mark. Held, subject to sal-
vage, and a suit to recover for replacing the tug in the water within ad-
miralty jurisdiction. The Gulfport, (Dist. Ct., S. D. Ala., I9I7), 243 Fed. 676. 
In the case of The Ella, 48 Fed. 56g, the Court was confronted with an 
analagous situation and allowed salvage. But in that case the question of 
jurisdiction does not appear to have been raised. Salvage is due for assist-
ance in dangerous situations at sea and for property preserved after having 
been cast on shore. Waite v. The Antelope, Fed. Cas. No. 17,045; Cope v. 
Vallette Dry Dock Co., II9 U. S. 625 .. "Shore" is defined as that space be-
tween ordinary high and low water mark, Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. l; 
Elliott v. Stewart, 15 Ore. 259. In the instant case the violence of the storm 
assisted by a time-worn definition had apparently placed the tug beyond the 
jurisdiction of the admiralty court. But the court was equal to the situation 
and extended the "shore" to include land on which waters have deposited 
things which are the subject of salvage. This is in accord with the liberal 
doctrine of admiralty courts which look to the subject matter rather than to 
narrow rules and definitions. 
ADOPTION-RIGHT OF !NH:ERITANCE-S£coND ADOPTION.-The Comp. Laws, 
I897, provide that on adoption the child shall become and be an heir at law 
of the adoptive parents. There was a second proceeding for the adoption of 
a child which was signed and assented to by the parties. Held, that it ipso 
facto revoked or superseded the first order of adoption of the child by other 
parties, and the child lost his right to inherit from his first adoptive parenls. 
In re Klap.p's Estate, (Mich., 1917), I64 N. W. 38I. 
The cases decide that unless the statute expressly provides otherwise, the 
adopted child will inherit from his natural parents as well as from his adopt-
ive parents. In re Walworth's Estate, 85 Vt. 322; Clarkso1i v. Hatton, 143 
Mo. 47; Flannigan v. Howard, 200 Ill. 396, IS MICH. L. R.£v. I61. In 
Patterson v. BroWtiing, 146 Ind. l6o, the court held that the second 
adoption did not revoke the right of inheritance from the first adoptive parent 
on the ground that the adopted child according to the statute inherits as if it 
were a natural child. "At all events there is no reason why the second adop-
tion should destroy the relation created by the first adoption and the legal 
capacity to inherit thereby created." Russell's Admfa. v. Russell's Guardian, 
14 Ky. Law Rep. 236, was decided the same way but no reasons were given 
for the decision. In the instant case the court said that the second adoption 
having destroyed the rights and obligations of the prior adoptive parents, 
destroyed the reciprocal right of inheritance. It differentiates this result 
from that of inheriting from natural parents even though adopted. "In the 
one case, by no act of the parent, can he prevent the child becoming his heir. 
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In the other case, the child cannot become his heir without his consent." 
This reasoning seems strong from the standpoint of free interpretation of 
the statute. But construing the statute strictly it would seem to follow that 
when the child becomes adopted its right to inherit becomes vested and could 
not be revoked by a subsequent adoption. 
BANKS AND BANKlNG-Al/tERATlON OF AMOUNT OF CHECK-SPA~ FOR 
AMOUNT IN WORDS Liwr BLANK.-Plaintiff's clerk presented blank check for 
signature to plaintiff, but there were the figures £2.o.o. in the space intended 
for figures. The check was signed and clerk raised the figures and wrote 
"one hundred and twenty pounds" in the space left for the words. Check 
was paid at the bank. Plaintiff sues for difference. Held, that the mandate 
to the bank was to pa1 £2 only and the circumstances did not constitute negli-
gence on part of plaintiff. Macmilla1i v. Londo1i Joint Stock Bank Limited, 
(1917), 2 K B. 439. 
The scope of the case of Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, is limited, and 
Scrutton, L. J., decides it is no longer authority. There is implied authority 
to fill blanks of a signed note but not to alter the terms. A11gle v. N. T¥. I11s. 
Co., 92 U. S. 330. The alteration of a note by filling in spaces and increasing 
the amount for which it was made avoids the note. Greenfield Savings Bank v. 
Stowell, 123 Mass. 1g6; Shipman v. State Bank, 126 N. Y. 318; Crawford v. 
W. S. Bank, 100 N. Y. 50. Hall v. Fuller, 5 B. 0. C. 750. The marginal 
figures being no part of the instrument, it has been held that where the 
holder of a note, in blank, filled it up and negotiated it for a larger sum than 
was indicated by the marginal figures, this does not vitiate the note although 
he also altered the figures. Schryver v. Hawkes, 22 Oh. St. 3o8. Johnston 
Harvester Co. 'v. McLean, 57 Wis. 258. The American cases hold that a de-
positor who signs blank checks assumes the risk. Trust Co. of America v. 
Conklin, n9 N. Y. Supp. 367. It is hard to reconcile the decisions with that 
in the instant case, for a check is a bill of exchange, and under the same 
facts, except that a check is not used, the drawer is held liable; Harvester Co. 
v. McLean, supra, even though the court decided that there was no negligence 
on the part of the drawer. 
BANKRUP'tCY-DlSCHARGE-"OB'tAINING PROP~TY llY FALSE P.RE'l'ENSES".-
The plaintiff took the defendant's note in renewal of a former note relying on 
defendant's false statement of assets, the former note having been given al-
most two years before. Held, that defendant's fraud would not render him 
criminally liable on the charge of obtaining property by false pretenses, nor 
would it keep him from being discharged in bankruptcy proceedings. Carville 
v. Lane, (Me. 1917), IOI Atl. g68. 
Section 17 of the BANKRUP'tCY Ac:r of I8g8 provides, "A discharge in 
bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except 
such as * * * are liabilities for obtaining property by false pretenses or false 
representations * * *". The recent case of In the Matter of Dunfee, 219 
N. Y. I88, held that a guaranty on a bond was "property" within the meaning 
of the section. For a thorough review of cases in point see IS MICH. L. 
Rr:v. 245. 
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Bn.r.s AND N~N'EGOTIABII.ITY-PRovxsmN FOR ExnNs10N oF TrM'E.-A 
promissory note contained a provision that "all parties to this note, including 
sureties, indorsers and guarantors, hereby * * * consent to extensions of 
time". Held, the provision rendered the time of payment uncertain and the 
note non-negotiable under the statutory requirement that a negotiable instru-
ment must be payable on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time. 
Cedar Rapids National Bank v. Weber, (Iowa, 1917), 164 N. W. 233. 
The court apparently was influenced and governed largely by previous. 
Iowa decisions to the effect that a provision that the holder may extend the: 
time of payment from time to time renders the note non-negotiable. Wood-
bury v. Roberts, 59 Ia. 348; Miller v. Poage, 56 Ia. g6. But, as has been 
pointed out in a previous number of this Ri;:vn:w, the authorities are in con-
flict upon this point, and the trend of modern decisions under the NEGOTIABr.~ 
INSTRUMENTS Ac::r appears to be toward the contrary view. 15 MICH. L. Ri;:v. 
510; First National Bank v. Baldwin, 100 Neb. 25. The theory underlying the 
latter view is that such a provision does not place upon the payee a duty to 
extend the time of payment, but rather that its sole purpose is to protect the 
holder against discharge of indorsers, guarantors, and sureties in case of an 
agreement between the holder or payee and the maker to extend the time 
of payment. Longmont National Bank v. Loukonen, 53 Colo. 48g. In First 
National Bank of Albuquerque v. Stover, 21 N. Mex. 453, a note containing 
a provision similar to that of the instant case was held negotiable, the same 
construction being applied as in the cases holding negotiable a note providing 
that the holder may extend the time of payment; that though the provision 
refers to "all parties," it does not give the maker or any other party authority 
to extend payment without the consent of the holder. While the construction 
applied in the instant case appears to follow more closely the literal statement 
of the provision in the note, yet the constru·ction applied in First Nationaf 
Bank of Albuquerque v. Stover, supra, would seem justifiable on the ground 
that the parties did not intend to do a vain act, such as the contract would 
virtually become if the maker could extend the time of payment at will. 
CARRD!Rs-CARRIAG~ OF P ASS'ENG'ERS-Lrnm~n TrcKET.-Plaintiff bought 
a ticket from a railroad company on the face of which was printed, "Good 
continuous passage, beginning date of sale only on train scheduled to stop 
at destination, otherwise passenger transfer to local train." R eld, a valid 
provision, being a reasonable regulation by the carrier. Louisville & N. R. 
Co. v. Rieley (Va. 1917), 93 S. E. 574 
There are two distinct lines of authority in cases like the above involving 
a time regulation on what is known as a general or straight ticket. The 
weight of authority is to the effect that in the absence of statutory prohibition 
a reasonable limit imposed by a carrier of passengers upon the time within 
which tickets sold by it may be used for passage will be upheld where the 
passenger has notice of the restriction. The conflict arises· where the pur-
chaser has not had notice of the regulation. One view is that the mere stamp-
ing or printing of a limitation upon a railroad ticket and the acceptance of 
such ticket by a passenger are not sufficient to bind him to such limitation 
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in the absence of actual notice of it, and his assent thereto when he purchases 
the ticket. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Turner, 100 Tenn. 213. To the 
same effect is Dagnall v. Southern Ry., 69 S. C. uo, affirming Norman v. 
Southern Ry., 65 S. C. 517, in which it is held, that a passenger has a right 
to ride on a ticket for which he has paid full fare, at any time unless his 
attention has been called to such limitations and he has assented thereto. 
The above cases go on the ground that the time limit should be dealt with as 
a term of a contract entered into between passenger and carrier and hence 
dependent for its validity, upon an actual or implied, "meeting of the minds," 
of the parties. The other class of cases claims that it should be considered 
a regulation of the carrier for the efficient conduct of its business and hence 
dependent for its validity, not upon the consent of the passenger, but upon 
whether or not it is reasonable. This view is supported by the larger num-
ber of cases. In Freeman v. Atcliiso1J, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 71 Kan. 
327, it was held that the purchaser will be presumed to consent to a reasonable 
limitation as to the time of the use of the ticket, which regulation is plainly 
expressed on the contract, though he does not sign the contract. That such 
a limitation is reasonable and that there could be no recovery for the ejec-
tion of plaintiff from the train was held in Trezona v. Cliicago G. W. Ry. Co., 
107 Iowa 22. Whether a ticket is to be regarded as evidencing a contract 
or as a token or voucher of the payment of fare only;the effect is the same; 
if the latter, it is the duty of the passenger who desires not to pay upon the 
cars to see that he has a proper voucher. Elmore v. Sands, 54 N. Y. 512. The 
present case only adds one more to the long list of cases holding that a ticket 
in its primary sense is evidence of the passenger's right to transportation and 
that a time regulation if reasonable is valid. It may be noted that those cases 
holding the contract view are comparatively recent cases. 
CoMMr:Rcr:-INTr:RSTA'l'S TnEGRAM-FAILURS TO DSLIV$ MsssAGt-LIAllIL-
l'l'Y.-A message announcing the death of plaintiff's mother was sent from 
Virginia to North Carolina, August 27, 1917, and through the negligence of 
the defendant was not delivered. Plaintiff asks damages for the consequent 
mental anguish which would be recoverable in North Carolina. Held, that 
since the act of Congress of June 18, 1910, (36 Stat. 539, c. 309), Congress has 
so taken over the regulation of the entire field of commerce with respect to 
the telegraph that state decisions in conflict with the law as administered in 
the Federal Courts are thereby superseded, Norris v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co. (N. C., 1917), 93 S. E. 465. 
In this country a number of states, chiefly southern, have by statute or 
decision recognized mental anguish as a foundation for damages. The Fed-
eral Courts, however, and the weight of American authority follow the com-
mon law in denying recovery. So. E~press Co. v. Byers, 240 U. S. 612. A 
long line of decisions in North Carolina sustain such damages both for inter-
state and intrastate messages. The latest of these cases, Penn v. Western 
Union Telegraph Co., 159 N. C. 306, was decided in 1912, two years after the 
Act of Congress relied upon in the principal case. In that case, the facts be-
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ing precisely identical. with those in the principal case, Judge Walker, who 
delivered the opinion in the Norris case, concurred with the majority of the 
court in awarding damages to the plaintiff. The Norris case rests its appar-
ent volte-face upon a decision of the preceding term. Meadows v. Postal Tel-
egraph & Cable Co., (No. Car., 1917), 91 S. E. 1009, which in tum rests its 
decision upon Gardner v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 231 Fed. 405. In 
that.case, decided Feb., 1916, it was ruled that by the aforesaid Acr, "Con-
gress having taken possession of the field of interstate commerce by telegraph, 
the provision of the constitution of Oklahoma relied upon [by the plaintiff] 
has become inoperative," and concluded in general that: "Congress has not 
only taken possession of the field of interstate commerce by telegraph, but 
has also specifically prescribed the rules which shall govern the transaction 
of such commerce." The novelty of the principal case lies in the North Car-
olina Court's apparent misconception of the scope of that Acr of CoNcru;ss 
upon which they predicate their decision. This misconception is doubtless 
traceable, in part at least, to the ultra-broad language of the decision in the 
Gardner case, above cited, which quotes among its authorities, Adams E~­
press Co. v. Cronfoger, 226 U. S. 491. It is true that the Supreme Court there 
declares the intent of Congress to take possession o~ the subject of the lia-
bility of a carrier under contracts for interstate shipment, and to supersede 
all state regulations with referep.ce to that subject. But there is no intima-
tion, either in that decision, in the CARMACK AMJ;NDMJ;NT which it professes 
to interpret, or in the Acr OF JuN:e 18, 1910, upon which the principal case re-
lies, which may conceivably be interpreted to intend that Congress assumes 
exclusive control of the entire field of interstate commerce. 
Coz.rM£RC$-RroUI.ATION-Pow:eRs oF STAT:es 0V£R CoMMUTATION RAT:es.-
The Pennsylyania Railroad Company sought an injunction to restrain the 
Public Service Commission of Maryland from enforcing a schedule of intra-
state rates ·for commutation tickets. The railroad, recognizing the propriety 
and necessity of rendering a peculiar service to suburban communities, had 
already established rates lower than the legally fixed standard one-way single 
passenger fare. Held, the state has the right to fix reasonable rates for the 
special services accorded commuters, different from those fixed for the gen-
eral service. Pe11n~1lvaiiia R. Co. v. Towers et al., (1917), 38 Sup. Ct. 2. 
The right to issue tickets at reduced rates, good for limited periods, upon 
the principle of commutation was recognized in the leading case of Inter-
state Commerce Commission v. B. &. 0. R. Co., 145 U. S. 263. In that ca'Se 
the court held that a party rate ticket for the transportation of ten or more 
at a less rate than was charged a single individual did not amount to a dis-
crimination against that individual within the meaning of the INTttSTATS 
CoMMttCS Acr. Such differences in rates were based upon substantial differ-
ences in the character of the services rendered, and the resulting discrimina-
tion was reasonable. In 1903, some years after the decision in the above case, 
the Er.KINS Acr was enacted, which provided against all discrimination. The 
court, by their decision in the instant case, have declared their intention to 
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abide by their previous interpretations of Congressional provisions against 
discrimination. Three of the Justices, including the Chief Justice, dissented 
from the decision, but no reasons were given for their action. 
CoNsT1TuTIONAJ, LAw-CoNsT1TuT10NAJ, AND CHARttR PRoVIs10Ns-RlGHT 
011 WOMEN To VOTE.-The constitution of the state prescribed the qualifica-
tions of the electors for all elections held to fill offices which the constitution 
itself provided for, and in all elections upon questions submitted to a vote 
pursuant to provisions of the constitution, to be that voters should be male 
citizens of the age of twenty-one. A charter was granted by the legislature 
to a municipality containing a provision which conferred upon women the 
right to vote in municipal elections. In a proceeding in ma11damus to compel 
the commissioners to permit the plaintiff to vote, held, that the charter pro-
vision was constitutional and therefore the mandamus was granted. State v. 
Fren:h, (Ohio, 1917), u7 N. E. 173. 
Coor.SY in his CoNSTlTUTIONAJ, LIMITATIONS (7th Ed. 99) says that, wher-
ever the constitution has prescribed the qualifications of electors, they cannot 
be changed or added to by the legislature, or otherwise than by an amend-
ment to the constitution. The description of those entitled to vote as re-
quired by the constitution excludes all others. McCafferty v. Guyer, 59 Pa. 
109. An act conferring upon women the right to vote for school commission-
ers, when the constitution provided that male citizens should be electors, was 
held unconstitutional. In the Matter of the Ca11cellation of the Name of 
Matilda Jnslyn Gage, 141 N. Y. 112. The contrary decisions follow the theory 
expressed by ]ONES, ]., dissenting in the instant case, wherein he says, "if the 
mai ority opinion be followed, the Legislature of the state may confine the 
elective municipal franchise solely to women, or to others, as it may choose." 
But this does not follow, for the legislature cannot nullify the constitutional 
requirements; it cannot exclude those who have been given the right, but 
must include them, though it may enlarge the class. Those authorities that 
are in accord with the principal decision contend that the constitutional re-
quirements are a description of those who shall not be excluded. The prin-
-ciple expressio u11ius. est exclusio alterius, in the interpretation of provisions 
-of the constitution, must be applied with great caution, and only those things 
expressed in such positive affirmative terms as to plainly imply the negative 
of what is omitted, will be considered as prohibiting the powers of the legis-
lature. Pi11e v. Commonwealth, (Va. 1917), 93 S. E. 652. The Michigan 
court has taken both views. Belles v. Biirr, 76 Mich. l; Coffin v. Election 
Commissioners of Detroit, 97 Mich. 188. The constitution is to be looked 
to, not to ascertain whether a power has been conferred, but whether it has 
been taken away. The legislature is practically omnipotent in the matter of 
1egislation, except in-so-far as it is restrained by the constitution, expressly 
or by necessary implication. It must be conceded that all persons can vote 
who possess the qualifications described in the constitution, but it does not 
follow that no others can vote. The instant case expresses the modem doc-
trines that the constitutional qualifications are not exclusive, but merely in-
dusive. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ScHoor. TuAcHtRs' PtNSION FuNn.-In an appeal 
from a judgment directing and commanding the defendant as county treas-
urer to set aside from the county tuition fund a sum equal to ten cents for-
each child of school age and to transmit the same to the state treasurer to-
be credited to "the teachers' insurance and retirement fund, held, under stat-
utes of North Dakota that the act was constitutional. State e~ rel Haig v. 
Hauge (N. Dak., 1917), 164 N. W. 28g. 
The constitutioa of North Dakota provides : "No tax shall be levied except 
in pursuance of law, and every law imposing a tax shall state distinctly the . 
object of the same, to which only it shall be applied" and, "Neither the state· 
nor any county, city, township, town, school district, or any other political 
subdivision shall loan or give its credit or make donations to or b aid of any 
individual, association or corporation, except for the necessary support of the 
poor * * *." There are two classes of teachers' pension fund cases in which 
this question arises, depending upon the sources of their funds. In one class 
the fund is created by statutes which provide that a certain per cent of the 
teachers' salary shall be deducted and placed in the fund, and in the other-
class the fund is created by taxation. In some instances the fund is supple-
mented by state appropriations, gifts and bequests. This question involves, 
"the due process clause" of the Constitution of the United States. It has. 
been held that a statute requiring the deduction of a certain per cent from a 
teacher's salary for such purpose or fund is unconstitutional, as interfering-
with the teacher's constitutional right to use his property for his own benefit. 
State v. Hubbard, 22 Oh. Circ. Ct. 252, 64 N. E. log. That case takes the view 
that the amounts retained are either taxes imposed upon teachers and invalid 
because not uniform, or they are a taking of private property without due· 
process of law. The case, however, is unsupported by authority. On the· 
other hand there are many cases which hold that such a statute is a part of 
the contract and that by the terms of the agreement the salary to be paid is. 
a net and not a gross amount, therefore, there is no taking of property .. 
Pennie v. Reis, 8o Cal. 266; Ball v. Trustees, 71 N. J. L. 64 In the second-
class of cases the question is entirely one of taxation. In order that a tax 
be valid, the tax must be for a public purpose and the classification of persons. 
or property which it concerns, reasonable. A tax in aid of the construction 
of a railroad is for a public purpose in practically all jurisdictions except 
Michigan. People v. Salem Twp., 20 Mich. 452. A tax to aid in the con-
struction of a grist mill is for a public purpose. Burlington Twp. v. Beasley, 
94 U. S. 310. It would seem to follow that a tax creating a fund for pension-
ing teachers was closely enough connected with the general subject of edu-
cation to be considered as for a public purpose and not as a gift to any person· 
or class of persons. In Fellows v. Connelly, (Mich., 1916), l6o N. W. 581, 
it was held that the act providing for a fund for pensions to school teachers 
did not violate the constitutional provision forbidding extra compensation to-
public employees, since it extends an equal inducement to teachers already 
under contract arid those who are induced by the act to enter public service. 
In the present case the objection is that it takes money from a fund raisea 
for one purpose and applies it to another purpose and this in violation of the: 
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state constitution. This feature only adds the question of interpretation. The 
fund was originally created for school purposes. In view of the many de-
cisions as to what is a public purpose in taxation it would seem, that this 
decision which says that the creation of a teachers' pension fund is germane 
to the general purposes for which the tax was authorized is reasonable. An 
extended discussion of the constitutionality of teachers' pensions will be 
found in u MICH. L. Rm. 45I, and I2 MICH. L. R.Ev. Io5. 
CoNSTITU'l.'IONAJ. LAW-TAXATION oF Fo~IGN CoRPORATIONS-PRIVII.EG~ oF' 
DOING DOMESTIC BUSINESS.-A statute provided that every foreign corpora-
tion should pay the commonwealth, in addition to a tax imposed by a pre-
vious statute, an excise tax of one-hundredth of one per cent of the value of 
its capital stock in excess of $10,000,000, the entire authorized capital stock 
to be used for a measure of the tax. Plaintiff sought to recover money paid 
under such act. Held, the act is constitutional and the tax is collectible by 
the state. International Pape1· Co. v. Commo1iwealth, (Mass., 1917), II7 
N. E. 246. 
Cases in the early history of corporation law held that a state had the 
power to tax a foreign corporation for the privilege of engaging in domestic-
business, even though such corporation was engaged at the same time in· 
interstate commerce. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, I3 Pet. 5I9; Western Union 
Tel. Co. v. Alabama, I32 U. S. 472. But in Western Unio1i Tel. Co. v. Kan-
sas, 2I6 U. S. I, the court declared, a statute which taxed the foreign corpor-
ation by a graduated scale for the privilege of doing intrastate business, un-
constitutional, as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment and burdening-
interstate commerce, because the tax was considered by the court as a tax 
upon the interstate business as well as the domestic business. See 8 MICH. 
L. R.Ev. 572. Later, in S. S. White Dental Mfg. Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 
U. S. 68, a tax for the same privilege with a fixed maximum of $2,000, the 
tax was held valid and the Kansas case is distinguished on the ground that 
the interstate and local business was not so connected as they were in the 
Kansas case. See I2 MICH. L. R.Ev. 2Io. The instant case goes further, and 
the pendulum is swinging back to where it was in the early history of cor-
poration law. In the principal case there was no maximum; a tax measured: 
by the entire capital stock, though it had only a small portion of its property 
within the state, was to be paid for the privilege of doing domestic business. 
Inasmuch as the power to tax carries with it the power to destroy, this de-
cision holds that the state may totally prohibit the doing of intrastate busi-
ness by a foreign corporation carrying on interstate commerce. The case 
will undoubtedly be carried to the United States Supreme Court and it will 
be of interest to note whether the dissenting opinion by Hor.MES, J., in the 
Kansas case willat last come into its own. 
CoNTRACTS-R.ESTRICTION UPON RESALE PRic~.-Plaintiff, as manufacturer 
of Ford Automobiles sued to restrain defendant "from engaging in what the 
plaintiff claims to be unfair practices, by which its rights are violated and the 
public is deceived." It appeared that defendant pretended to be a distributing 
128 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
"agency'' for Ford cars and sold them below the price stipulated in the con-
tracts which plaintiff made with its authorized agents. Held, the judgment 
of the lower court dismissing plaintiff's bill, should be reversed and further 
proceedings ordered. Ford Motor Co. v. Benj. E. Boone, Inc. (C. C. A. 9th 
Circ., 1917), 244 Fed. 335. 
· The court based its ruling on the proposition that by using the recog-
nized Ford trademarks and otherwise leading the public to believe it was an 
authorized agency the defendant was guilty of "unfair and deceptive prac-
tices" from which the plaintiff was entitled to protection. This had nothing 
whatever to do with validity of contracts between the plaintiff and its real 
agents ; indeed the cou~ expressly assumed for the sake of argument that 
such contracts were invalid. The court then, however, to what end is not 
clear, discussed the legality of the contracts. This is of interest in compari-
son with the case of the same plaintiff against the UNION MoroR SALES Co., 
noted below. The contract here involved, unlike that in the Union Sales Co. 
case, specifically provided that title should not pass from the plaintiff, even 
though the full agent's price had been paid, until the plaintiff should have 
signed a bill of sale to some one purchasing a car for use, not merely for 
re-sale. It was contended that this reservation of title was "only an adroit 
attempt to avoid the effect of certain decisions" such as those on which the 
Union Sales Co. decision was based, and that it ran counter to the rule of 
such cases. The court held the reservation of title to be valid and effective 
aJ?.d that the plaintiff could, therefore, legally limit the price at which cars 
might be sold to users. In discussing such cases as those in which the Union 
Sales Co. decision was based the court strongly indicates that the contracts 
involved in those cases were invalid because they effected "the exclusive 
control of a useful or desirable article of commerce" while the contracts in 
the present case covered only one type of desirable articles. The court cites 
no authority in support of the effect of its distinction, but its idea is probably 
the same as that more pertinently considered in Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker, 
164 Cal. 355. 
CoN'tRAC'l'S-~STRIC'l'ION UPON ~ALE PRICS-lNVALID.-Plaintiff sued to 
restrain defendant from inducing authorized distributors of Ford automo-
biles to sell them at less than the price which they had contracted with plain-
tiff to maintain. Held, the injunction should be denied. Ford Motor Co. v. 
Union Motor Sales Co. (C. C. A. 6th Circ., 1917), 244 Fed. 156. 
Refusal to grant the relief asked was predicated upon the proposition that 
the agreements not to resell below a fixed price were contrary to public policy 
and illegal, being an iptproper restraint of trade. "* * * It is the general and 
well-settled rule," said the court, "that a system of contracts between a man-
ufacturer and retail dealers, by which the manufacturer, in connection with 
absolute sales of his product, attempts to control the resale prices for all 
sales, by all dealers, eliminating all competition, and fixing the amount which 
the ultimate purchaser shall pay, amounts to restraint of trade, and is invalid 
both at common law and, so far as it affects interstate commerce, under the 
SHllRMAN ANTI-TRUST AC't." Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 
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U. S. 373; Joh1i D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24, 12 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 135; United States v. Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co., 222 Fed. 725. 
The court found specifically that title to the machines had been passed from 
the plaintiff to its distributors. In the Hartman case, cited, the court called 
attention particularly to the fact that, "The reasons which might uphold cove-
nants restricting the liberty of a single buyer might prove quite inadequate 
when there are a multitude of identical agreements." It is this "system of 
contracts", as the courts call it, which distinguishes such cases as these from 
the numerous ones holding single contracts in restraint of trade to be valid 
and enforcible. A single contract not to resell below a stipulated price was 
upheld in Garst v. Harris, I77 Mass. 72 and in Clark v. Frank, I7 Mo. App. 
6oz. Even systems of such contracts have been held valid and enforcible in 
particular circumstances. See Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker, I64 Cal. 355, dis-
tinguishing Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, supra, on the ground that the 
contracts in that case involved the entire public supply of the product while 
those in the particular case, although they applied to all that the parties could 
control, covered only a part of the entire supply available to the public; 
Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, 76 Wash. 649, 5I L. R. A. (N. S.) 522; 
Grogan v. Chaffee, I56 Cal. 6n, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 395; Com. v. Grinstead, 
III Ky. 203; 56 L. R. A. 709; Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb. 252, SL. R. A. 
(N. S.) 136N. In accord with the principal case is Hill Co. v. Gray & Wor-
cester, I63 Mich. I2, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 327. A contention was made by coun-
sel that the automobiles were covered by patents and that it is lawful "to 
create a monopoly in patented articles." The court answered, on the author-
ity of such cases as Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. l, an,d Motion Picture 
Patents Case, 243 U. S. 502, that, inasmuch as plaintiff had passed the title 
to the distributors, the chattels were no longer subject to the patent monop-
oly. The court made no reference to the fact, and counsel seems not to have 
presented it, that a monopoly in the use, manufacture, or sale of patent~d 
articles is already created by the patent statute, and that contracts such as 
those involved in the case do not "create" any monopoly but simply limit 
the extent to which the owner of the statutory monopoly has released it. 
15 MICH. L. Rtv. 581; John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, supra. How-
ever, even if it be logically unsound to ignore this, the cases seem likely to 
stand as law, if only upon the doctrine of communis e"or. 
CoNTRACTS-RsSTRICTION UPON RssALI": PluCI":-VALm.-Plaintiff sued, as 
manufacturer of Ingersoll watches, to restrain defendant from reselling them 
at a price below that required by a notice affixed to each watch originally 
sold by plaintiff. Held, a motion to dismiss the bill should be denied. Robt. 
H. Ingersoll & Bro. v. Hahne & Co. (N. J. Ct. of Ch., I9I7), IOI Atl. I030. 
The decision in this case is in flat conflict with that of the Ford Motor Co. 
case, supra. The facts do not show any privity of contract between the par-
ties, but the court apparently assumes that there was a contract. In dispos-
ing of the defendant's contention that the contract, so far as it restricted the 
resale price, was invalid, the court said, "On the argument there was, and in 
counsels' brief ·there is, a long discussion as to whether the contract against 
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price cutting, evidenced by the notice, is contrary to public policy, and de-
fendant relies upon cases in the Supreme Court of the United States as fol-
lows: (Citing the same cases relied upon as supporting the decision in the 
Ford Motor Co. case). I am now considering the public policy of the state 
of New Jersey as distinguished from any public policy of the United States. 
Unless the article is the subject of interstate commerce, I am not bound by 
the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States. They are entitled 
to great weight and careful consideration, but it must not be overlooked that 
the effect of the case of Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 
-243 U. S. 502, * * * (decided April 9, 1917) is a complete reversal of Henry 
v. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1. * * * Suffice it to say that, after careful considera-
tion, I have come to the conclusion that, upon the general proposition, I 
agree with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Dr. Miles Med-
ical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S., at p. 411." 
CRIMINAI, LAw-SuFFICISNCY oF lNDICTM:EN'.r.-An information, charging 
the defendant with the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses, failed 
to show any causal connection between the alleged false pretenses and the 
.surrender of the money. The defendant demurred generally to the infor-
mation. The demurrer was overruled, and the defendant was convicted. He 
was denied a new trial, and appealed, on the ground that his demurrer should 
have been sustained. Held, that there was no ground for a reversal. People 
'V. Griesheimer, (Cal., 1917), 167 Pac. 521. 
The majority of the court, in the principal case, displayed no hesitation in 
totally ignoring what has become a well-settled rule of pleading. The court 
.admits that there is no direct allegation to the effect that the money was given 
to the defendant because of the alleged false pretenses, states that "a direct 
.allegation to this effect would have been more in accord with technical re-
.quirements" ; but avers that "no person of common understanding could fail 
to unJerstand that it was substantially charged, by necessary inference at 
1east, that the money was paid because of the alleged false representation, and 
for the purpose suggested thereby,'' and relies, for its refusal to grant a re-
versal, on the provision of the California constitution providing that no judg-
ment shall be set aside or new trial granted for error as to pleading unless 
the court is of the opinion that it resulted in a miscarriage of justice. In a 
strong and well-reasoned dissenting opinion, HENSHAW, J. takes issue with the 
majority of the court, and upholds a fundamental rule of pleading that every 
indictment or information must contain direct averments, and only those 
'inferences may be drawn therefrom which the law itself draws, and the omis-
sion to charge the causal connection between the false representations and 
the deprivation of property is a fatal defect in the indictment or information, 
of which the defendant may avail himself by a general demurrer. The mi-
nority opinion likewise attacks the argument of the majority based on the 
-constitutional provision, declaring that, merely because a guilty man has been 
found guilty, it does not follow that there has been no "miscarriage of jus-
tice," but that there has been a "miscarriage of justice" whenever any man 
:has been forced to trial upon a criminal charge wider an indictment or infer-
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mation which does not measure up to the rules of legal sufficiency; that there 
has bee!]. a "miscarriage of justice," even though the evidence may show 
guilt, if there was no proper procedure before the court to justify the taking 
of that evidence. It is to be noted that, in reaching its decision in the prin-
.cipal case, the court was divided four to three, and that the majority opinion 
fails to cite a single authority in support of its proposition, while the minority 
has substantiated its argument with unnumbered authorities. 
ESPIONAGE ACT-PosT OFFrcr:-NoN-MAII.ABI.E MATTSR-S1>n1T1ous PuBI.1-
.cATIONs.-In an action to enjoin the postmaster of the city of New York 
from keeping the plaintiff's publication, "The Masses:• out of the mail, held, 
that, under the ESPIONAGE ACT OF JuNr: 15, 1917, the defendant was not war-
ranted in excluding the journal in question. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 
(Dist. Ct. S. D., N. Y., July 24. 1917), 244 Fed. 535. 
The particular portions of the ESPIONAGE ACT construed by the court in 
the principal case were those making it an offense to "willfully make or con-
vey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the opera-
tion or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to pro-
mote the success of its enemies,'' and declaring such matter non-mailable as 
has the effect either of willfully causing or attempting "to cause insubordina-
tion, disloyalty, mutiny or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces of 
the United States" or willfully obstructing "the recruiting or enlistment serv-
ice of the United States to the injury of the service" or which contains "any 
matter advocating or urging treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to 
any law of the United States." The court says that a willfully false state-
ment includes only a statement of fact which the utterer knows to be false, 
and that the act does not have the effect of making it an offense to make any 
statement which is within the range of opinion or criticism, or which is cer-
tainly believed to be true by the utterer; that the right to criticize is not in-
vaded by the act, and the utterer of any statement may fall back upon a de-
fense similar in nature to the defense of "fair comment" in libel suits. The 
.act is held not to be violated by any action short of urging upon others that it 
is their duty or their interest to resist the law. One may not counsel or 
.advise others to violate the laws of the United States as they stand, but any 
action other than a direct advocacy of resistance to the existing law is held 
not to be a violation of the act. It would seem that such an interpretation of 
the act deprives it of much of its force; and that the opposition and agitation 
attendant upon its enactment was, in view of such an application of it, all a 
.crossing of a bridge which has not been built as yet (NOTS.-Press reports 
are to the effect that the Circuit Court of Appeals has reversed the holding 
in the principal case.) 
F1sH-PUBI.Ic RIGHTS-NAVIGABI.E WA'tSRs.-Plaintiff, owner of marsh 
land in part within the boundaries of an arm of Sandusky Bay, off Lake 
Erie, sought to enjoin defendants from hunting and fishing on plaintiff's 
land. Held, defendants as members of the public were entitled to hunt and 
fish on the land of plaintiff within the limits of the bay even though the water 
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covering such land was not deep enough to be navigable. Winous Point 
Shooting Club v. Slaughterbeck, (Ohio, 19I7), u7 N. E. 162. 
This case puts the waters of the Great Lakes and the bays and arms. 
thereof in precisely the same class, so far as rights of hunting and fishing 
are concerned, as tidal waters, and navigability in fact is not a test of the 
right. The court also disposes of whatever uncertainty there may have arisen 
as a result of Bodi v. Winous Point Shooting Club, 57 Oh. St. 226, as to the 
right of the public to fish in navigable, non-tidal streams the beds of which 
are owned privately. The principal case interprets the earlier case as hold-
ing that in such waters there is no public right of fishing. See 16 MICH. 
L.~.37. 
G:rn-ON CoNDITION-ENGAG£M£NT RING-RIGHT TO RE'tURN OF RING.-
Upon her promise of marriage, the plaintiff presented the defendant with an 
engagement ring which she wore in the ordinary way for several months. 
She then broke off the engagement, whereupon the plaintiff brought suit for 
the recovery of the ring. Held, plaintiff can recover. Jacobs v. Davis (I9I7). 
2 K. B. 532. . 
The court relies upon the historical development of the practice of giving 
engagement rings. Their conclusion is that the ring is a "pledge or some-
thing to bind the contract of marriage," and is given upon the implied condi-
tion that it should be returned if the donee should break off the engagement. 
Whether the ring should be considered as a pledge or a conditional gift was 
not expressly determined in this case, the result being the same on either 
theory. In Stromberg v. Rubenstein, 44 N. Y. Supp. 405, recovery of an en-
gagement ring was denied on the ground that the defendant was an infant. 
The decision may be justified if we treat the transaction as a contract, but 
it is rather difficult to see how infancy would constitute a defense if we 
adopt the conditional gift theory. With regard to presents of tangiole prop-
erty, other than engagement rings, exchanged between parties to a marriage 
contract, several rather early English cases allow recovery, apparently pro-
ceeding on the theory that such presents are conditional gifts. I FoNB. EQ., 
Ed. 3, 439; Young v. Burrell, Cary 77; Robinson v. Cumming, 2 Atk. 409. 
One case reporteq in 14 VIN . .ABR. TIT. GIFT, pl. 7, seems to support the pledge 
doctrine. In Williamson v. Johnson, 62 Vt. 378, a sum of money was sent 
by a young man to his fiancee to enable her to buy her trousseau and to travel 
to his home. Although the trial court found as a fact that the money was 
intended as an unconditional gift, made .in expectation of marriage, the Su-
preme Court permitted recovery. Several theories were advanced which are 
not wholly consistent: that it was a conditional gift; that it was not a gift 
in a strict legal sense, being "made in expectation and under an arrange-
ment that they were for specific purposes,'' upon failure of which "the de-
positor'' might recover; that it was a case of failure of consideration. See 
WOODWARD, QUASI-CONTRACTS,§ 48. 
GRAND JURY-MEN-WoMtN.-Defendant filed a motion to set aside an 
indictment upon the ground that the grand jury that found the indictment was 
not a legal grand jury in that it was composed of eleven meri and eight wo-
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men and that twelve men could not concur in the indictment. Held, that the 
word men as used in the Cons OF CIVIL PRoCEDURt, Sec. Igo, defining a jury 
as a boqy of men did not include women notwithstanding Pen. Code, Sec. 7, 
which provides that the words used in a masculine gender shall include wo-
men, and hence that the indictment was not found as prescribed by the Cons. 
People v. Lensen, (Cal. App., 1917), 167 Pac. 406. 
Upon examination of the cases cited in support of the principal case it is 
found that in no one of them was the question raised as to the right of a 
woman to be a juror. Hmmel v. State, 86 Ind. 431; Smith v. Times Publish-
ing Company, 178 Pa. 481; State v. McClear, II Nev. 39. In Rosencrantz v. 
Terr., 2 Wash. Terr. 267, a married woman could be a grand juror under 
a code provision that all householders and electors shall be competent grand 
jurors, but this case was overruled by Harland v. Terr., 3 Wash. Terr. 131, on 
the ground that the above mentioned act was void for defective title so that 
although the decision in Rosencrantz v. Terr., (supra) is overruled, nothing 
is decided affirmatively in that state as to whether a women could be a grand 
juror. No other states have interpreted the word men as used in this con-
nection. Re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232 and Re Lockwood, 9 Ct. Cl. 346, hold that 
men cannot include women even though, as in the principal case, there is 
found a provision that words importing masculine gender shall include the 
feminine. In Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. Terr. 599, it was held that an adult 
citizen meant only a male inhabitant. Acts to give women the right to vote 
for school and city officers were held to be in violation of constitutional re-
strictions which give to men the right to vote. Coffin v. Bel. of Election Com-
missioners of Detroit, 97 Mich. 188; Gougar v. Timberlake, 148 Ind. 38; 
Allison v. Blake, 57 N. J. L. 6. But Wheeler v. Brady, 15 Kan. 26; State v. 
Cones, 15 Neb. 444, and Plummer v. Yost, 144 Ill. 68 hold to the contrary. 
But the pronouns he and his include women as well as men. So there is no 
statutory inhibition by the use thereof. State v. Jones, 102 Mo. 305. Re 
Tlio111as, 16 Col. 441. Richardson's Case, 3 Pa. Dist. R. 299. It may be true 
that the framers did not contemplate that women should be jurors. But it 
does not follow that they intended the contrary. The truth is that they had 
no intention one way or the other and that the matter was not even thought of. 
If it is held that the construction of the statute is to be determined by the 
admitted fact that its application to women was not in the minds of the legis-
lature when it was passed, where shall the line be drawn? 
HUSBAND AND WIFE-HUSBAND'S LIABILITY FOR His win:s ToRT.-Hus-
band and wife were joined as defendants in an action for alienating the af-
fections of the plaintiff's husband. The plaintiff admitted that the defendant 
husband was not a joint tort-feasor and sought to sustain a judgment which 
she recovered against both defendants on the ground of the husband's gen-
eral liabilty for his wife's torts. Held, that the husband was not liable. Clax-
ton v. Pool, (Mo., 1917), 197 S. W. 349. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri found itself in an unfortunate position. 
The tort had been committed before the enactment of the statute freeing the 
husband from liability for his wife's torts, and the precedents were opposed 
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to the just result the statute would have reached. StSSION Ar:!rs I9I5, 26g. 
Missouri had followed the majority of states in allowing a married woman 
to maintain an action for the alienation of her husband's affections. Clow v. 
Chapman, I25 Mo IOI; Weber v. Weber, II3 Ark. 47I, L. R. A. I9I5 A 67 
note. Again with the majority, Missouri had strictly construed its M.ARRitD 
WoMAN's Ar:!I: leaving the husband liable, as at common law, for his wife's 
torts generally. Taylor v. Pullen, I52 Mo. 434- The wrong was not connected 
with. the wife's separate estate, so that fairly well established distinction 
could not be invoked, as it had been in Boutell v. Shellaberger, 264 Mo. 70. 
The opinion in Nichols v. Nichols, I47 Mo. 387, clearly upheld the husband's 
liability, but it is said to be dictum. Perhaps so, but the Boutell case supra 
cites it for this dictum.· Even "on the facts" of the decided cases, slander 
uttered by the wife (for which the husband had been held liable in Taylor v. 
Pullen, supra) would have had to be distinguished. This the lower court 
tried to do, basing the distinction on whether the wife's wrongful act was 
also a separate wrong to the husband. Claxton v. Pool, I82 Mo. App. I3. The 
Supreme Court seeks the "larger consistency" that the common law has been 
said to be noted for. The "spirit and trend of legislation," "recent customs 
and methods of dealing," woman's "freedom of action and independence" 
triumph. The Missouri court meets the issue as squarely as could be ex-
pected. The same result was reached in Iowa without reference to statutes 
and without discussion. Heisler v. Heisler, (Ia., I9IO), I27 N. W. 823; 
Pooley v. Dutton, I65 Ia. 745. The other cases since the note in 6 MICH. L. 
Rev. 405, seem to have been based on statutes. 
NAVIGAl3r.t WATERS-RIPARIAN R.IGHTS-ACCRtTION.-Where a gradual, 
imperceptible addition to riparian land on Lake Michigan was caused jointly 
by "the natural action of the water and by piers, built out into the lake by 
other landowners, held, that this addition constituted ~ccretion which be-
longed to the owner of the contiguous riparian land. Brundage v. Knox, 
(Ill., I9I7), II7 N. E. 123. 
The typical case of accretion is the increase to riparian land by natural 
causes, for instance, by the natural action of the water. Accretion is some-
times confined to this case. BoUVItR, LAW Dir:!r.; ANDERSON, LAW Dir:!r.; In 
re Driveway in City of New York, 93 N. Y. Supp. uo7. But by the great 
weight of authority the doctrine of title by accretion is extended to accretion 
resulting from artificial causes. Lovingston v. County of St. Clair, 64 Ill. 56; 
Tatum v. City of St. Louis, I25 Mo. 647. Any one of the leading theories of 
the basis of title by accretion supports this extension. One theory asserts 
that the loss of land by erosion should be compensated for by allowing title 
by accretion. 2 BI.AcKsroNE's Co:MM., 262. Public policy is the keynote of 
another theory, viz., that all land should have an owner and that it is most 
convenient that accretion should follow the ownership of the shore. Wallace 
v. Driver, 61 Ark. 429. The doctrine of title by accretion, says a third theory, 
rests on the necessity of preserving to the riparian landowner the right of ac-
cess to the water. Lamprey v. State of Minnesota, 52 Minn. 181. A dis-
tinction is taken where the accretion is caused, wholly or in part, by an arti-
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1icial condition created by the riparian owner purposely to effect an accretion 
to his own land. Generally, title by accretion is disallowed in such a case. 
Att'y Gen. v. Chambers, 4 De G. & J. 55, 5 Jur. N. S. 745; C. B. & Q. Ry. v. 
Porter Bros. & Hackworth, 72 Ia.¢. Yet the English court, in Doe v. East 
India Co., 10 Moo. P. C. 158, says that no such distinction can be made. It 
-would be interesting to know if the courts would make the same distinction 
where the accretion results from an artificial condition created by the riparian 
-0wner, but not with the purpose of causing an accretion to his own land. 
NUISANCS-LANDI.ORD AND TuNAN't-OVERHANGING Tnts-LEssoR's DUTY 
"'to TENANT.-The plaintiff was a tenant of the defendant who owned and 
.occupied an adjoining farm. On the defendant's land three feet from the 
fence stood a yew-tree. In January, 1917, the branches of this tree projected 
.more than three feet beyond the fence· and the plaintiff's mare ate of them 
and died. The evidence showed that the branches were overhanging at the 
·commencement of the tenancy. Held, by Rowlatt, J., that the landlord was 
not liable because a lessee takes the land as he finds it. Coleridge, J., dissent-
ing insisted that the defendant was liable within the principle, "sic utere tuo 
ut alienum non laedas." Cheater v. Cater, (C. A.) [1917), 2 K. B. 516. 
The liability of an adjoining owner for bringing a dangerous substance 
.on his land, if it escapes to his neighbor's injury, was established in the case 
.of Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3, H. L. 330, the substance being in that case 
water artificially confined. At first blush the analogy between overhanging 
"'branches and escaping water may not seem striking, but they are at least 
alike in their inherent possibilities for mischief. The early case of Lonsdale 
·v. Nelson, 2 B & C, 302, established that a landowner is maintaining a nuisance 
if his trees overhang. In ·crowhurst v. Amersham Burial Board, 4 Ex. D. 5, 
.quoting Rylands v. Fletcher, supra, and followed in Smith v. Giddy, [1904), 
.2 K. B. 448, quoting the same, it was held that a landowner is liable to an 
adjacent owner in tort for the death of cattle which eat the projecting 
'branches of poisonous trees. The case of Erskine v. Adeane, L. R. 8. Ch. 
App. 756, upon which the decision in the principal case rests, the question 
was one of warranty, but Mellish, J., added obiter the principle of caveat 
'lessee, i.e., the tenant taking a lease must take the land as he finds it; or else 
ask an express warranty against such existing conditions as he fears may be-
come dangerous. Coleridge maintains that if the parties were merely neigh-
bors, the defendant would be liable and that the relation of landlord and 
·tenant should rather increase than diminish the duty owed. Admitting the 
soundness of Mellish's dictum he declares that it does not here apply because 
the nuisance and therefore the liability came into existence after the lease was 
consummated. Until the cattle could reach the branches there was no nuis-
ance. Rowlatt admits the liability of adjoining owners without privity of 
estate, or even that between vendor and vendee where the title passes to 
·everything usque ad caelum but reiterates the dictum caveat lessee as a bar 
to recovery in the present instance. That a landlord who is also an adjacent 
owner is liable to his tenant as to a stranger for a nuisance on his own ad-
joining property, is dismissed with a casual sentence or altogether ignored by 
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the textwriters. l UNDERHILL, TRi> LAW OF LANDLORD AND fiNANT, 481; 
TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND fiNANT, § go, quoting Smith v. Fa:t:on, 156 Mass. 
589. Just why the relation existing between the parties should result in a for-
feiture of the protection owing from one neighbor to another is difficult to 
analyze logically, and practically no light is thrown on the question in the 
reported cases. It would seem then that the decision in the principal case 
based as it is upon dictum unsupported by case or. text citation, makes so 
startling a departure in the hitherto established responsibility of landholders 
that the vigorous dissent of Coleridge appears amply justified both by logic 
and in the light of precedent. 
NUISANCE-UNDERTAKING EsTABLISR?.mNTS.-Defendant proposed to trans-
fer his undertaking business, including a morgue, to a building immediately 
adjoining the plaintiff's residence in a residential section of the city. De-
fendant had always conducted his business in a sanitary manner and in ac-
cordance with the rules of the state board of health. In decreeing an in-
junction against the establishment of the business in the residential section, 
held, although an undertaking business is not a nuisance per se, its location 
in a residential district would constitute a nuisance. Saier, et al. v. Joy, 
(Mich., 1917), 164 N. W. 507. 
An interesting feature of the instant case is that an undertaking business, 
although properly conducted, is deemed a nuisance in a residential district 
solely because it would serve the persons living nearby as a constant reminder 
of death and consequently would cause them mental depression. The instant 
case follows Densmore v. Evergreen Camp No. z47, W. 0. W., 61 Wash. 230. 
On the same principle the court in Barth v. Christian Psychopathic Hospital 
Association, (Mich., 1917), 163 N. W. 62, enjoined the maintenance of a pri-
vate insane asylum in a residential district, although on similar facts, an in-
junction was refused in Heaton v. Packer, u6 N. Y. Supp. 46. The main-
tenance in a residential district of a private hospital for consumptives was 
enjoined in Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, and of one for victims of can-
cer in Stotler v. Rochelle, 83 Kans. 86, the court in each case holding such an 
institution became a nuisance, if located in a residential district, because it 
created a fear of infection causing mental unrest, although, in the light of 
medical science, such fear is probably unfounded. A hospital, in a residential 
district, for crippled children was held not a nuisance "though undoubtedly 
pain and distress will sometimes be caused by the sight of suffering to those 
living nearby." Hall v. House of St. Giles the Cripple, 91 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 
122, (affirmed in. 158 N. Y. S. 1u7). A cemetery or burial ground in a res-
idential section is not a nuisance which can be enjoined. Sutton v. Findlay 
Cemetery Ass'n, 270 Ill. II; Monk v. Packard, 71 Me. 309; Harper v. City of 
Nashville, 136 Ga. 141. 
SEAMJ>N-WRo AM StAMJ<:N-WIRELESS T1u;£GRAPR 0P.£RA'TOR.-A wireless 
telegraph operator who was required to sign ships articles at a stated wage 
of twenty-five cents per month, and who was classed as an officer and messed 
with them, sued for failure to fu~ish him medical care. Held, to be a sea-
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man and a member of the ship's crew and as such entitled to such care, even 
though in fact he was hired and paid by the Marconi Company and was on 
board pursuant to a contract between it and the ship owners. The Buena 
Ventura, (D. Ct. S. D. N. Y., 1916), 243 Fed. 797. 
This case appears to be the first case determining whether a wireless tele-
graph operator is a seaman, but seems to be a logical application of the 
general rules laid down by former cases. In The Chicago, 235 Fed. 538, it 
was held that a person contracting to work for another for hire and inci-
dentally rendering services upon a vessel is not a seaman if the services are 
not to be rendered to the vessel or charterer as such, while in The Marie, 
49 Fed. 286, the rule is that the crew of a vessel in a general sense comprises 
all persons who in pursuance of some co·ntract or arrangement with the 
owner are on board the same, aiding in the nagivation thereof. In the prin-
cipal case it should be noted that although the operator was under contract 
with the Marconi Company he was required to sign the ships articles, was 
there in pursuance of some arrangement with the owner of the vessel, was 
under his orders and that his services were rendered in aid of navigation 
thereof, since his presence increases the safety of the vessel in times of dan-
ger. The broadest principle however that has yet been recognized is that the 
service rendered must be necessary or at least contribute to the preservation 
of the vessel or of those whose labor and skill are employed to navigate her. 
Trainer v. The Superior, Fed. Cas. No. 14,136. Thus a carpenter is required 
for the preservation and repair of the ship in case of accident, a cook to 
feed the crew and a physician to administer to the sick. It might also be said 
that a wireless operator is needed for protection of both the vessel and 
those engaged in her operation. Every service which contributes in con-
templation of law to the management, safety, or benefit of vessel has a mari-
time character and privilege. D. C. Salisbury, Fed. Cas. No. 3694- The word 
seamm has been enlarged so as to include bartenders, The J. S. Warden, 175 
Fed. 314; fishermen, Carrier Dove, 97 Fed. III; pursers, Spinetti, v. The 
Atlas Steamship Co., So N. Y. 71; cooks, Lawson v. The James H. Shrigley, 
50 Fed. 287; coopers, U. S. v. Thompson, Fed. Cas. No. 16,492; pilots, deck 
hands, engineers, firemen, Wilson v. The Ohio, Fed. Cas. No. 17,825; and 
others, but not to include musicians, Trainer v. The Superior, (supra), ser-
vants of the master, Sunday v. Gordon, Fed. Cas. No. 13,616, and masters, 
Grennell v. The J olm A. Morgan, 28 Fed. 895. 
ToRTS-lNTr:&FERr:NCS W1TH EMPI.OY:MENT-RIGHT ro STRIKE-SitcoNDARY 
STRIKS.-Defendant, Brotherhood of Carpenters, in order to enforce a union 
rule prohibiting its members from working with non-union men or upon ma-
terials made in shops employing non-union men, sent out a circular letter 
warning owners, contractors, and builders not to secure materials made in 
non-union shops or defendant's men would refuse to work on them. Plain-
tiff conducted an open shop for the manufacture of building materials. Held, 
that defendant's acts were not illegal and would not be restrained. Bossert 
v. Dhuy, (New York Ct. of App., 1917), TH:it D.AII,Y RscoRD, Rochester-Syra-
cuse, October 15-16, 1917. 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
The instant decision affirms National Protective Associatio1i v. Cumming,. 
170 N. Y. 315, and fully commits the New York courts to the doctrine that a.. 
strike primarily for the betterment of the union or its members is legal, even 
though directed against third parties with whom the union has no trade dis-
pute. Upon the point here involved, that is, whether it is legal to strike against 
A., with whom there is no dispute, in order thus indirectly to enforce demands 
against B., there is a sharp conflict of authority. The courts supporting the 
doctrine of the instant case base their decision largely on the ground that 
whatever an individual workman may lawfully do laborers in combination 
may also lawfully do; that they may quit when they see fit, with or without 
reason, so long as no cc;mtract is broken, and so long as the act is not done 
with malice; that it is not illegal to refuse to allow union members to work 
with non-union men, and that, by the ·same reasoning, it is not.illegal to refuse 
to allow union members to work upon materials furnished by non-union 
shops, since such action has relation to work to be performed by the men and 
directly affects them. Parkinson Company v. Building Trades Council, 154-
Cal. 581; State v. Van Pelt, 136 N. Car. 633. The opposite view is supported 
by Lord Macnaghten, in Quinn v. Leathem, [1901], A. C. 495, not on the 
ground of malicious intention, ''but on the ground that a violation of legal 
right committed knowingly is a cause of action, and that it is a violation of 
legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognized by law if there 
be no sufficient justification for the interference". The TRAnt DISPUTts Ac:r 
of 1go6 (6 Edw. 7, c. 47) seems to have changed the rule in England. Sev-
eral American courts, however, still hold squarely that labor unions shall not 
strike against persons with whom they have no trade dispute. Burnha1n v. 
Dowd, 217 Mass 351; Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572; Plant v. Woods, 176 
Mass. 492; Purvis v. United Brotherhood, 214 Pa. St. 348; Gatzow v. Buen-
ing, lo6 Wis. l. See, also, 16 MICH. L. Rsv. 57. 
